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Making the Modern Criminal Law and the Paradox of Civil Order 
Henrique Carvalho, University of Warwick 
 
 Making the Modern Criminal Law1 is Lindsay Farmer’s latest comprehensive effort to expose 
and examine the social role of the criminal law, and how this role influences and conditions legal 
scholarship. This book represents, in many ways, the culmination of a project that can be traced back 
to Farmer’s first monograph, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order.2 At the same time, Making the 
Modern Criminal Law is also part of the Criminalization series at Oxford University Press, a collection 
of works which arose from a research project undertaken by Farmer together with Antony Duff, Sandra 
Marshall, Massimo Renzo and Victor Tadros. The remarkable sophistication of Farmer’s latest book 
can therefore be seen as the encounter of two paths, his long scholarship on the historical and contextual 
relationship between criminal law and social order on the one hand, and his participation in the wealth 
of recent debate on the grounds and limits of criminalization on the other.  
In this short contribution, I intend to briefly discuss what I consider to be some of the most 
important elements of the core concept of the theoretical framework presented in the book: namely, 
Farmer’s discussion and elaboration of civil order. I start by introducing how this discussion fits into 
the general argument in the book, and outline some general characteristics of Farmer’s notion of civil 
order. I then examine in further detail how Farmer’s conceptualisation grounds a critique of the 
limitations of contemporary criminal law scholarship, and discuss how it can inform a critical 
examination of the ideological dimension of civil order more broadly. In the final part of the paper, 
before some concluding thoughts,  I raise a few reflections about how Farmer’s theoretical framework 
and reflect on how it can be taken forward.  
 
The Problem of Civil Order 
 
 To a significant extent, thinking about the role that criminal law plays in society, the problems 
that surround this role and the ways in which legal scholarship relates to it inevitably involves looking 
at issues of criminalization; that is, it involves dealing with the question of “what and who should be 
treated as criminal under the law and the ways it can be justified.”3 For Farmer, the most adequate 
pathway towards addressing this question lies in understanding the criminal law as a social institution, 
concerned with performing a specific social function. Farmer has for a while now, persuasively argued 
that the primacy given by criminal law scholars to normative principles and values, such as individual 
autonomy and liberty, which results from the pervasive influence that moral and political philosophy 
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exert on legal scholarship, leads to an inadequate conceptualisation of the criminal law that neglects its 
concrete character as a modern institution.4 Proper attention to this institutional dimension in turn 
reveals that the modern criminal law is largely shaped by “the broad aim of securing civil order,” so 
that it can only “be made ‘fully intelligible’ by looking at it from the perspective of the aim of securing 
the civility of civil society.”5 Farmer’s notion of civil order is more specific than a broader idea of social 
order, of maintaining the minimal conditions of social life. Instead, it comprises “the co-ordination of 
complex modern societies composed of a range of entities or legal persons that are responsible, in a 
range of different ways, for their own conduct, for the wellbeing of others, and for the maintenance of 
social institutions.”6 In this sense, the criminal law not only has a specific social function, but it is also 
a function that is tied to a specific notion of society, which is inextricably linked to the history of 
modernity and its conceptions of civility and civilization. 
 The idea that the criminal law is primarily concerned with the aim of securing civil order carries 
interesting implications. The first is that, contrary to what many criminal law scholars believe, criminal 
law and security are not fully distinct or distinguishable interests, and neither is the ‘securitisation’ of 
criminal law a recent phenomenon.7 The second is that, again contrary to more traditional assumptions, 
the role of the criminal law is broader than, and ultimately distinct from, that of punishment; as will be 
discussed in more detail below, Farmer argues that the tendency to tie criminal law and punishment 
together tends to prevent us from appreciating the criminal law’s real institutional function. Thirdly, 
and this is where I want to focus now, the idea of civil order suggests that the institutional function of 
the criminal law has a specific quality which is intrinsically linked with the project of modernity and its 
civilizing process;8 “our task”, according to Farmer, “is to understand the place of criminal law in this 
process.”9 
 Farmer pursues this task by dividing his book into three parts. The first part is dedicated to 
explaining the core of his argument, by discussing what it means to think of the criminal law as an 
institution, and what it means to think of the purpose of that institution as that of securing civil order. 
Here, criminalization itself is posited as the reflection of the link between criminal law and the project 
of civility; that is, the development the criminal law is the result of the need to promote and protect 
particular images of civil order, which involve normative ideas about what society is and how 
individuals in that society should behave. “Criminalization, or the question of the proper scope of the 
criminal law, is thus framed as a question of the rational government of individuals and their interests 
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in a commercial society with the end of securing civil order.”10 The second and third parts of the book 
explore this institutional character of the criminal law through the historical development of what came 
to be considered aspects of the general and the special part of the criminal law respectively. 
This historical and theoretical exploration is focused on English criminal law, and starts at the 
late part of the eighteenth century, at a period that Farmer identifies as constituting the dawn of criminal 
law as a modern institution. Farmer’s deployment of notions such as modernity and order follows 
certain theoretical assumptions, which have as one of their points of reference the work of Charles 
Taylor in Modern Social Imaginaries.11 Taylor’s notion of social imaginary is a way of thinking about 
society which conceptualises its underlying normative framework as fluid and dynamic, whose social 
images and expectations are inherently malleable. According to Taylor, in thinking about a social 
imaginary, “I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit 
together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are 
normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.”12 What 
characterises a modern social imaginary, furthermore, is that it is underpinned by a specific moral order, 
constituted by that Taylor described as “an ethic of freedom and mutual benefit.”13 To guarantee and 
promote these normative ideas, the modern state is entrusted with the provision of “certain common 
benefits [to its citizens], of which security is the most important.”14 From this perspective, therefore, 
the very way in which we imagine modern societies is intrinsically tied to a concern with security. It is 
arguably for this reason that the primary manifestation of the ethics of freedom and mutual benefit 
enunciated by Taylor is a specific notion of order, a social configuration in which these values can not 
only be expressed, but also—and primarily—organised and secured. 
Farmer further develops this understanding by characterising the modern social order as one 
inherently linked to the civilizing process. In order to properly examine this relation, it is important to 
note that the notion of civilization can be understood as possessing both a normative and a sociological 
dimension. In the normative sense, civilization is often contrasted to the status of non-civilized or 
‘barbaric’ societies, as an ideal standard of progress and of living that societies should attain or sustain. 
In the sociological sense, in turn, the idea of ‘being civilized’ has a very specific context and 
development, linked to the history of Europe and to the values that evolved around the notion of 
modernity.15 Farmer alludes primarily to this second dimension of the term, stating that ‘civilization’ 
should be understood as “a particular configuration of selfhood, violence, and law” produced by “the 
modernizing process.”16 Just like the social order which for Taylor results from a modern social 
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imaginary, the idea of civil order is also fluid. As Farmer indicates, “there is no single or simple concept 
of civil order which it is the aim of the criminal law to secure or produce.”17 It is this fluidity that 
characterises the socio-historical character of civil order, presenting it as the result of the interaction 
between ideas of selfhood and social and political organisation on the one hand, and the cultural, 
historical and political context in which these ideas have to be actualised on the other. 
 
Civil Order and the Civil(ised) Subject 
 
If the fluidity and dynamism of the idea of civil order means that manifestations of this idea 
change and transform over time, the notion that all these manifestations represent a form of civil order 
also evidences the ideological character of the civilizing process. It is ideological in that it provides 
disparate social frameworks and institutions with a broad sense of legitimacy, by linking them to the 
normative dimension of civilization and thus suggesting that these forms of order are not only 
appropriate to their context, but also the ideal or best kind of order that could be achieved. In so doing, 
forms of civil order repress levels of insecurity and disorder in society, by presenting themselves as a 
product of the civilizing process. A critical analysis of civil order must be wary of the extent to which 
the idea of modernity is not only a product of a specific socio-political trajectory, but also an idea of 
society that is actively produced, and deployed to reinforce specific social values and expectations. It 
is thus important to be aware of the “deep structural embeddedness” of the civilizing process in modern 
society as both expressing and repressing the existence of “civilizing and decivilizing forces both 
competing with and simultaneously shaping and reshaping each other”18 within its remit. Similarly, 
what we call “civilization” must be understood as involving “ambivalent power dynamics, which work 
to repress the negative forces it embodies in [favour] of a purely progressive perspective on social 
development.”19 
Farmer’s analysis of the institutional role of the criminal law provides important insights that 
are helpful to such an examination. One such insight comes from Farmer’s discussion of the relationship 
between civil order and individual subjectivity. On the one hand, the idea of a civil order presupposes 
the attainment of a specific level of sociability, where individuals in society are deemed to display a 
high degree of trust, interdependence and self-control. This notion of individual autonomy and 
responsibility is at the core of the project of modernity, where “the ‘individual in society’ is seen as the 
source of order.”20 At the same time, however, this notion of individual autonomy is itself 
conceptualised as dependent on the conditions provided by civil order. In other words, the idea of 
autonomy that is presumed by the notion of civil order is also conceptualised as depending on civil 
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order to exist. Thus “although the individual is seen as the primary unit of analysis, it is recognized that 
the social individual is [actually] produced by government.”21 From this perspective, the aim of the 
criminal law in securing civil order is intrinsically linked to a process of subjectification,22 in which the 
kind of individuality which is embedded in the idea of the legal subject is being actively produced 
through the violence of criminalization. 
This aspect of Farmer’s theoretical framework is particularly important to an understanding of 
the problems and limitations found in contemporary criminal law theory. Chapter Three of Making the 
Modern Criminal Law traces the development of criminal law scholarship in modernity through the 
historical emergence of four periods or moments, each characterised by a specific ‘ideal type’: public 
wrong, the legislative state, penal welfarism, and neo-classical criminal law. Each period is mainly 
analysed through the work of an ‘exceptional’ scholar who is deemed to have expressed the zeitgeist of 
criminal law thinking at that particular moment: William Blackstone, James Fitzjames Stephen, 
Glanville Williams, and Andrew Ashworth respectively. Farmer’s conceptualisation of the current state 
of criminal law as ‘neo-classical’ is meant to suggest that it is characterised by a reaction or resistance 
against “the disorder and fragmentation of the actual criminal law by positing a kind of ideal order in 
the criminal law.”23 This image of an ideal order is largely dependent on an abstract conception of 
individual autonomy and agency,24 since it essentially privileges normative conceptions of individual 
responsibility and social order that are essentially independent from socio-historical contingencies—
what Elias has called the “we-less I.”25 Farmer’s discussion stresses how this idealised conception of 
criminal law, which is inherently tied to notions of retributive punishment, fails to capture the reality of 
criminalization, thus producing a skewed idea of what the criminal law really is. This critique, which is 
in many ways the main argument pursued in the book, is detailed in the subsequent chapters of the book, 
which expose how the contours of the criminal law cannot be defined in the abstract, following 
normative principles, but rather depend on its institutional purpose. 
 
Securing the Paradox of Criminal Law 
 
An important implication of Farmer’s critique of contemporary criminal law scholarship, which 
deserves particular attention, is that the institutional role of the criminal law in securing civil order, as 
well as contemporary scholarship’s neglect of this role, are not only related, but are also inherently 
contradictory. The final chapter of the second part of Making the Modern Criminal Law arguably 
provides the best illustration of Farmer’s exploration of this contradictory character of contemporary 
criminal law, through a discussion of criminal responsibility. While most recent normative accounts of 
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the criminal law celebrate the idea of subjective responsibility as the main guarantor of individual rights 
and the main corollary for a minimalist criminal law, Farmer exposes how the rise of individual 
responsibility in the framework of criminal liability did not hinder, but rather actually assisted in a 
continuous expansion of the scope of criminalization. The neo-classical focus on responsible 
subjectivity, grounded on the premise that the criminal law is required to establish responsibility before 
it can assign blame, cannot explain why, throughout modernity, impulse of treating individuals as 
responsible has controversially made them increasingly responsible for more.26 
The third and last part of the book, besides further developing the argument concerning the 
expansion of criminal liability, also illustrates how the idea of responsibility is not only contingent in 
historical terms, but also shaped and conditioned by the specific area in which it operates, and the kind 
of behaviour which it aims to regulate. By looking at criminalization in the areas of property, person 
and sex, Farmer discusses in rich detail how the notion of responsibility changes to reflect specific 
normative expectations and regulatory needs. The book concludes by stressing once more how the 
‘criminalization question’ is tied to the idea of civil order, and by highlighting how an understanding 
of this connection is fundamental to a proper examination of what he deems the “paradox of the modern 
criminal law,” namely, “that despite being shaped by a liberal sensibility that state power should be 
limited and the desire to respect individual rights and liberties, it has expanded in scope, more or less 
continually, since the late eighteenth century.”27 At the heart of this paradox, then, lies the notion that 
the criminal law’s efforts to maintain and produce specific kinds of order and subjectivity lead it to 
continually produce new or expanded forms of criminalization. Thus, although the criminal law claims 
to promote and secure the conditions for individual freedom, the way in which it actively does so is by 
continually restricting that same freedom. 
Farmer’s diagnosis of this paradox is acute and sophisticated, but it leaves space for further 
elaboration in some areas. For instance, there is a lot to be said about how the paradox of modern 
criminal law to a significant extent mirrors and reflects a paradox that is inherent to the civilizing 
process contained within the very idea of civil order. The ambivalent power dynamics mentioned above 
indicate that the civilizing process is constantly concerned with repressing its negative aspects, 
producing and maintaining the same violent tendencies which it is supposed to eliminate.28 From this 
perspective, the neo-classical period in criminal law is less a reaction against the current fragmented 
condition of criminal law, and more the latest manifestation of a constant tension in the modern pursuit 
for civil order. Perhaps the criminal law is always violent and disordered, and perhaps its function of 
securing civil order requires it to always be rationalised in a way that attempts to repress and deny its 
contradictory character—to deny its own contingency. 
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Moreover, although Farmer has explicitly left a detailed examination of the civil order as a 
broader social phenomenon outside the scope of his book, understandably deciding to focus on the 
specific part that criminal law plays on the modernising process, and while such theoretical and 
conceptual restrictions are inevitable, it is also important to explicitly acknowledge that such conceptual 
distinctions themselves have obvious limits. For instance, as mentioned above, Farmer repeatedly 
rejects the traditional link between criminal law and punishment maintained by the normative 
framework of neo-classical criminal law theorists, stressing that the criminal law must be de-coupled 
from punishment if its institutional role is to be properly examined. While it is definitely important to 
maintain that the criminal law goes beyond the retributive ideals embedded in its normative 
justifications, it must also be recognised that the legitimatory framework of criminal law cannot be 
made fully intelligible if completely divorced from the idea of punishment. In many respects, practices 
of criminalization and punishment are intimately connected; this arguably includes the extent to which 
punishment, as a social phenomenon and institution, itself is in service of the project of civil order. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In suggesting that the paradox that he identified is somehow unique to modern criminal law, 
Farmer may have missed an opportunity to deepen and further explore what will undoubtedly be 
considered one of the main intellectual contributions of his latest book, the notion of civil order as a 
thicker, more sophisticated conception of legal and social ideas of order which underpin the institutional 
contours of the criminal law. However, this should not be taken as a shortcoming in his conceptual and 
theoretical project; quite the contrary. This is most likely the reflection of Farmer’s rigorous historical 
method, and of his effort to subsume complex ideas under clear expositions and detailed factual 
examples. Within the scope of his enquiry, Farmer provides us with a rich and purposeful exploration 
of the history and current framework of English criminal law, which imposes a strong demand upon 
criminal law scholarship, and legal scholarship more broadly, to actively engage with the social, 
political and historical context of criminalization. 
